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Abstract 
 The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (1935) 
authorized a state's right to prohibit unions from requiring a worker to pay dues, even when the 
worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.  Within a short time of the amendment's 
passage, twelve (12) states passed "right-to-work" laws, as did ten (10) more states in the 
intervening years.  Although there has been considerable research on the influence of right-to-
work laws on union density, organizing efforts, industrial development and some study of wage 
differences, there has been no examination of the legislations’ effect on business and economic 
conditions across states.  In this paper, the average differences in business conditions, personal 
income, and employment across states that have enacted right-to-work laws versus those that do 
not have this legislation are examined using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA).  
Our most notable result is the finding that although right-to-work states may be more attractive 
to business, this does not necessarily translate into enhanced economic viability for all sectors in 
the right-to-work state.  Not only are personal income and employment lower, but there are no 
significant differences in the number of firms and business formations between right-to-work and 
non-right-to-work states. 
   
Keywords:  right-to-work laws, business formation, employment, Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) 
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Introduction 
 “Right-to-work” is the phrase that is used by opponents of unionization to describe what 
is known as “open shops.”  Under state right-to-work laws, union membership is not a 
requirement for employment and workers can choose whether they want to be in a union even if 
the company is unionized.  This makes it more difficult for unions to organize and attract new 
members in already unionized firms and inhibits the growth of unions in new areas.  Proponents 
of right-to-work laws believe that states with these laws are more “business-friendly” and thus 
exhibit higher economic growth than states without such legislation.1 
 The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (1935) 
authorized a state's right to pass laws that prohibit unions from requiring a worker to pay dues, 
even when the worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.  Within a short time of 
the amendment's passage, twelve (12) states passed "right-to-work" laws, as did many other 
states in the intervening years.2  Although there has been considerable research on the influence 
of right-to-work laws on union density, organizing efforts, industrial development (Moore (1998) 
and Moore and Newman (1985)), and wages (Mishel (2001)), there has been no study of the  
right-to-work laws' effect on business formation and economic growth.  In this paper, we will 
examine the differences in business conditions, personal income, and employment across states 
that have enacted right-to-work laws versus those states that do not have this legislation, using 
pooled data for every state over the periods 1990, 1995, 2000-2005.  The data will be analyzed 
using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) which allows us to consider a joint 
                                                            
1   See the website http://www.nrtw.org/b/rtw_faq.htm of the National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation, Inc. and the website http://www.right‐to‐work.org/ of the National Right to Work Committee.  
2   Currently, there are 22 states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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distribution of the endogenous variables and to test for differences simultaneously.  To our 
knowledge, this is the most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of right-to-work laws that 
currently exists in the literature. 
Background 
 Mishel (2001) examines the average effect of right-to-work laws on wages.  He controls 
for differences in the cost of living throughout the United States, thereby making wages 
comparable in various parts of the country and also examines how metropolitan areas located in 
both right-to-work and non-right-to-work states affect wages.  Mishel (2001) finds that the mean 
effect of working in a right-to-work state results in a six (6) to eight (8) percent reduction in 
wages for workers in these states.  Controlling for regional costs of living reduces this amount to 
approximately four (4) percent.  Reed (2003) also studies the wage effects of right-to-work laws.  
Using state-level data, he finds that right-to-work states have average wages that are significantly 
higher than non-right-to-work states, with results that are robust across a wide variety of 
specifications.  An important distinction of this study is that it controls for state economic 
conditions at the time states adopted right-to-work legislation.  States that adopted right-to-work 
laws were generally poorer than other states and the failure to control for these initial conditions 
may be the reason why previous studies have not identified a positive wage impact for right-to-
work states.  Using CPS data for 1977-2002, Farber (2005) tests the standard wage determination 
model's prediction that the threat of union organization increases nonunion wages and reduces 
the union/nonunion wage differential.  Estimates focusing on two states' introduction of right-to-
work laws depict that in one state the law was associated with a statistically significant drop in 
nonunion wages.   
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 The only study that comes close to examining differences in economic conditions, other 
than wages, is by Abraham and Voos (2000).  The authors accomplish an empirical examination 
of whether or not stockholder wealth rises in response to passage of a right-to-work law.  
Stockholder wealth rose when Louisiana passed such a law in 1976 and when Idaho did so in 
1985-1986.  Presumably this occurred because investors anticipated higher future profits with 
weaker labor unions or a lower probability of future organization.  The results from this study 
show that these laws indeed hamper labor union activity. 
 While research exists regarding the impact of right-to-work laws on workers' earnings, 
there has really been no study of the impact of right-to-work laws on business and labor market 
conditions across states.  We will attempt to fill this void by examining, from a multivariate 
perspective, whether differences exist in variables such as firm “births,” terminations, 
bankruptcies, self-employment, proprietors’ income, state per capita personal income, and 
employment rates between right-to-work and non-right-to-work states, ceteris paribus. 
Empirical Model, Data, and Hypotheses 
Model Specification 
 The data used in this study was mostly collected from the United States Small Business 
Administration, Small Business Economic Indicators.3  The business condition variables 
measured by state over the years 1990, 1995, 2001-2005 are, 
• number of employer firms,  
• total self-employed (in occupation), 
• number of business formations (births), 
• number of business terminations, 
• number of business bankruptcies, and 
• proprietors’ income.4 
                                                            
3   http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sbe.html  
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It is important to note that this data is measured for all businesses, not just what is considered 
“small,” e.g., less than 100 employees.  In addition to the business condition variables, we used 
two additional factors that are measures of the overall economic viability of a state,  
• per capita personal income, and 
• the employment rate (employment to population ratio). 
A complete description of the variables may be found in Appendix A.5  All variables are 
expressed in natural logarithmic form.   
 Since several dependent variables will be fitted to the same effects (right-to-work v. non-
right-to-work), tests can be made involving the parameters of several dependent variables.  
Assuming we have a pooled, cross-sectional time series with n T⋅  observations, p dependent 
(endogenous) variables, 1k  covariates, 1T −  year effects, and 1r −  regional effects, our model 
may be specified in matrix form as, 
 1 2 3 4Y R C YR REβ β β β ε′= + + + +
??
 ,         (1) 
where Y is an n T p⋅ ×  matrix of dependent variables, R is an 1n T⋅ ×  vector of the right-to-work 
dummy variable, C is an 1n T k⋅ ×  matrix of covariates, YR is an ( 1)n T T⋅ × −  matrix of year 
effects (dummy variables), RE is an ( 1)n T r⋅ × −  matrix of regional effects (dummy variables) 
and ε  is an n T p⋅ × matrix of random errors.  For multivariate tests, there needs to be 
assumptions made about the errors.  We assume that with p dependent variables, there are 
n T p⋅ ×  errors that are independent across observations but not across dependent variables, 
 ( ) n TVar Iε ⋅= ⊗Ω , 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
4   The data on proprietors’ income was taken from http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/.   It also would have 
been nice to have corporate profits by state, but that information does not exist. 
5   Although it is not listed here, we also use Proprietors’ Income as a dependent variable.  
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where Ω  is p p× .  We assume, using the specification in equation (1), that there are 
covariates on the right hand side.  Equation (1) will be estimated two ways: by using both per 
capita income and the employment rate as covariates or controlling factors and then assuming 
that there are no covariates, e.g., all eight of the variables mentioned above are treated as 
endogenous with just the right-to-work, year, and regional dummies as exogenous variables. 
Data Issues 
 Dumond, Hirsch, and MacPherson (1999) controlled for the regional cost of living in 
their study of the effect of right-to-work laws on wages using the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development "Fair Market Rents" for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA).  Since it is 
well known that there is no universally accepted method of adjusting for regional costs of living 
and it is impossible to test the accuracy of using an index based on fair market rents, this same 
method will not be used.  We decided to “proxy” differences across regions/states by using a set 
of regional dummy variables based upon the U.S. Census Bureau, Census Regions and Divisions 
of the United States.  These should be sufficient to capture differences across regions and/or 
states. 
 The list of the twenty-two (22) states with right-to-work laws may be found in Table I.   
The pooled data is from 1990, 1995, 2000 to 2005 and there are only two states that have enacted 
this legislation during this time period: Oklahoma and Texas.  Since we would like to ensure that 
states have sufficient time to adjust to legislative changes, these two states will be omitted from 
this analysis.6  That leaves us with a total of 392 observations ( 49 8n T⋅ = ⋅ ). 
[ Insert Table I Here ] 
 
                                                            
6   It is important to note that the model estimates do not change whether these states are included or not. 
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Hypotheses 
 In a MANOVA, the overall null hypothesis involves testing the equality of mean vectors. 
We would like to test whether there is a mean difference in all of the endogenous variables 
between the right-to-work (RTW) and non-right-to-work (NRTW) states, 
 0
:
: ,
RTW NRTW
A RTW NRTW
H
H
μ μ
μ μ
=
≠
? ?
? ?          (2) 
where RTWμ′?  and NRTWμ′?  are both 8 1×  vectors containing the population means of the above 
named dependent/endogenous variables, 
• number of employer firms,  
• total self-employed (in occupation), 
• number of business formations (births), 
• number of business terminations, 
• number of business bankruptcies,  
• proprietors’ income, 
• per capita personal income, and 
• the employment to population ratio. 
 
Analogously, the model specified in equation (1) can be used to test the null hypothesis, 
 
 0 1
1
: 0
: 0.A
H
H
β
β
=
≠
?
?           (3) 
 
 Of course, if we fail to reject the omnibus null hypothesis, this would indicate that the 
enacting of right-to-work laws has had no perceptible effect on business and economic 
conditions across states--controlling for regional differences and time.  If the null hypothesis 
were to be rejected, then the alternative is to determine which variables do exhibit mean 
differences and what the magnitude of those differences are between the right-to-work and non-
right-to-work states.   
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Empirical Results 
 As mentioned previously, equation (1) (above) will be estimated two ways.  First, per 
capita personal income and the employment rate will be regarded as explanatory variables along 
with the exogenous right-to-work, year and regional dummies.  In other words, we would like to 
determine if right-to-work legislation has had any influence on business condition variables, 
(number of employer firms, total self-employed, number of business formations, number of 
business terminations, number of business bankruptcies, and proprietors’ income) across U.S. 
states, controlling for or holding constant per capita personal income, employment, year, and the 
regional effects.7  In the second case, the only explanatory variables are the exogenous right-to-
work, year and regional dummy variables—the business condition variables along with the 
overall measures of economic conditions by state (per capita personal income and the 
employment rate) are all treated as dependent/endogenous variables.    
 There are four multivariate statistics that are computed in SAS 9.1 to test the null 
hypothesis of no overall effect of right-to-work ( hypotheses (2) and (3) above),8 
• Wilks' lambda, 
• Pillai's trace, 
• Hotelling-Lawley trace, and 
• Roy's maximum root. 
 
The numerical values for each of these statistics and their associated P values are in Table II.  
The MANOVA results for the first case noted above (including per capita personal income and 
the employment rate as explanatory variables) are found in the top table, while the results for the 
second case (per capita personal income and the employment rate are treated as dependent 
                                                            
7   Of course, we do realize that if per capital personal income and the employment rate are truly 
endogenous, then treating them as explanatory variables may introduce endogeneity bias. 
8   See SAS Products, SAS Stat, SAS Stat Users’ Guide, Proc GLM, Syntax, MANOVA Option, SAS Institute, Inc., 
Cary, NC , 2003. 
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variables) are in the bottom table.  It is clear from both sets of results that the null hypothesis in 
both (3) and (4) above cannot be accepted.  While the implication here is that there is a 
significant difference amongst  the business and economic condition variables between right-to-
work versus non-right-to-work states (in both cases), it may initially seem that the proponents of 
right-to-work laws may be right in saying that right-to-work laws help to “revive” state 
economies and that right-to-work states exhibit a higher standard of living than do non-right-to-
work states.9  However, this conclusion may be premature, since any inferences cannot be made 
without examining the nature of the differences in the business and economic conditions, which 
is what we will now present. 
[ Insert Table II Here ] 
 The estimates of the right-to-work regression parameter are presented in Table III for 
each of the aforementioned cases.  It is interesting to note that in Case I, essentially all of the 
right-to-work parameter estimates business condition variables are statistically significant 
(except bankruptcies) with the expected sign.  Thus, when per capita personal income and 
employment are held constant or controlled-for across states, then right-to-work states do impart 
a better business environment--there are more firms, more business formations and 
terminations10, more self-employment and higher proprietors’ income in right-to-work states as 
compared to non-right-to work states, ceteris paribus.  Of course, the results in Case II provide a  
different representation of the economic viability of right-to-work states.  When both per capita 
income and the employment rate are treated as dependent variables, then states that have enacted 
right-to-work laws do not fare as well as those states that did not.  One would expect that right-
                                                            
9   Unions Try to Hang On as Open Shop Laws Gain Ground, U.S.A. Today,  Money Section,  Thursday, July 26, 
2007, pp. 1B‐2B, and http://www.nrtw.org/b/rtw_faq.htm.  
10   More business terminations are not necessarily a “bad” thing, since more terminations indicate a more 
dynamic business sector. 
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to-work legislation would help “revive” a state’s economy because businesses would be more 
amenable to moving to states with right-to-work laws.  According to the results of this study, this 
perception does not have any empirical support.  As may be seen in Table III, there is no 
statistically significant difference in the mean number of employer firms and business formations 
between right-to-work and non-right-to-work states.  Moreover, the overall measures of 
economic conditions across states are both lower in the right-to-work states—average per capita 
personal income is 6.7 percent lower and the average employment rate is 5.8 percent lower in the 
right-to-work states, controlling for year and regional differences.11 
[ Insert Table III Here] 
 Another result from Table III that deserves comment is the difference in the right-to-work 
parameter estimate for the self-employment variable in Cases I and II.  Self-employment is 33.8 
percent higher in right-to-work states when per capita personal income and the employment rate 
are controlled for.12  When these two are considered dependent variables, self-employment is 
39.3 percent higher in the right-to-work states.13  Of the many questions raised by entrance into 
self-employment, a fundamental one concerns the reasons behind the self-employment decision. 
While some argue that people have been “pulled” into entrepreneurship by the guarantee of 
independence, self-development or exploring a market opportunity, others present reasons that 
individuals have been “pushed” into it because of restructuring and downsizing, unemployment, 
                                                            
11   The reader will note that these percentages are different from the parameter elasticity estimates in Table 
III.  When there are dummy variables with a log‐transformed dependent variable, the parameter estimate is not 
interpreted as an elasticity.  The percentage impact of the dummy variable on the dependent variable is computed 
as, 
  g = 100 (exp(b - V(b)/2) - 1), 
where the V(b) is the squared standard error of the estimate.  See Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy 
(1981) for more information on this transformation.   
12   Ibid. 
13   Ibid. 
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or dissatisfaction with previous employment (Blanchflower (2004)).  The results in this study 
seem to indicate support for the latter—a larger number of self-employed exists 
contemporaneously with lower per capita personal income and employment in the right-to-work 
states. 
Conclusion           
 The diverse results between the two models can be clarified.  In the first case where per 
capita income and employment are on the “right-hand” side of the equation, any “trickle-down” 
that may result from improved business conditions are controlled for.  Thus, business conditions 
are more favorable in the right-to-work relative to the non-right-to-work states because the 
overall economic measures of personal income and employment are held constant across all 
states.  Once those overall measures are considered as dependent variables, the improved 
economic position of the right-to-work states dissipates somewhat.  The implication here is that 
although right-to-work states may be more attractive to business, this does not necessarily 
translate into enhanced economic viability for everyone in the state.  Not only are personal 
income and employment lower, but there are no significant differences in the number of firms 
and business formations between the right-to-work and non-right-to-work states. 
   The issue of which is the “correct” model may be answered from an econometric 
standpoint.  All of the eight dependent variables in Case II can be considered endogenous.  As 
such, if any appear on the “right-hand” side of the equation, then the potential exists for bias due 
the correlation of the endogenous variable/s with the error term.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
second model is the least problematic and yields results that support the contention that right-to-
work states are no better than non-right-to-work states (and sometimes worse) in attracting new 
businesses, creating employment, and generating product and income.  
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Table I 
Right-to-Work States 
 
 
State Years Enacted/Amended 
Alabama 1953 
Arizona 1946, 1948, 1982 
Arkansas 1944, 1947 
Florida 1968, 1974, 1977 
Georgia 1947 
Idaho 1986 
Iowa 1947, 1977, 1978 
Kansas 1958, 1975 
Louisiana 1976 
Mississippi 1960 
Nebraska 1946, 1947, 1961, 1977 
Nevada 1952 
North Carolina 1947 
North Dakota 1948, 1987 
Oklahoma 2001 
South Carolina 1954 
South Dakota 1946, 1947, 1955 
Tennessee 1947 
Texas 1993 
Utah 1955 
Virginia 1947, 1954, 1956, 1970, 1973
Wyoming 1963 
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Table II 
MANOVA Results 
 
 
Case I – With (Controlling For) Per Capita Personal Income and the Employment Rate 
 
 
MANOVA Test Criteria and Exact F Statistics for the Hypothesis of No Overall Right-to-Work State Effect
H = Type III SSCP Matrix for R_to_W_State 
E = Error SSCP Matrix 
 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F
Wilks' Lambda 0.77882243 13.06 8 368 <.0001
Pillai's Trace 0.22117757 13.06 8 368 <.0001
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.28398973 13.06 8 368 <.0001
Roy's Greatest Root 0.28398973 13.06 8 368 <.0001
 
 
Case II – Without Per Capita Personal Income and the Employment Rate  
 
 
MANOVA Test Criteria and Exact F Statistics for the Hypothesis of No Overall Right-to-Work State Effect
H = Type III SSCP Matrix for Right-to-Work State 
E = Error SSCP Matrix 
 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F
Wilks' Lambda 0.81620643 13.81 6 368 <.0001
Pillai's Trace 0.18379357 13.81 6 368 <.0001
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 0.22518025 13.81 6 368 <.0001
Roy's Greatest Root 0.22518025 13.81 6 368 <.0001
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Table III 
 
Regression Results 
 
(All Variables are Expressed in Natural Logarithm Units) 
 
Case I:    Per capita personal income and employment rate treated as explanatory variables 
Case II:  Per capita personal income and employment rate treated as dependent variables 
 
      Case I    Case II                         
 
      Right-to-Work  Right-to-Work 
Dependent Variable    Parameter Estimate  Parameter Estimate  
       (Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
 
Number of Employer Firms
itNEF    .1925 (.0924)**  .1670 (.1101) 
       
Number of Self-Employed Persons
itSE   .2961 (.0975)***  .3381 (.1141)*** 
 
Number of Business Formations
itBF   .2266 (.0999)**  .1770 (.1175) 
 
Number of Business Terminations
itBT   .2815 (.0955)***  .2626 (.1116)** 
 
Number of Business Bankruptcies
itBB   -.1015 (.1125)   -.0443 (.1302) 
  
Proprietors' Income
itPRI     .3331 (.0971)***  .2404 (.1185)** 
 
Per Capita Personal Income
itPI    n/a    -.0689 (.0167)*** 
 
Employment Rate
itEMP     n/a    -.0595 (.0183)*** 
 
 
**   - Statistically Significant at .05α =  
*** - Statistically Significant at .01α =    
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Appendix A 
Variable Descriptions 
 
(All variables are measured by state over the years 1990, 1995, 2000-2005) 
 
 
 - Right-to-Work Law Enacted in State ( 1,  zero (0) otherwise)
 - Number of Employer Firms
    - Number of Self-Employed Persons (000s)
    - Number of Business Formations (Births)
 
it
it
it
it
it
RTW
NEF
SE
BF
BT
=
   - Number of Business Terminations
    - Number of Business Bankruptcies
   - Proprietors' Income ($)
     - Per Capita Personal Income ($)
  - Employment Rate (Employment to Populatio
it
it
it
it
BB
PRI
PI
EMP n Ratio)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The data for all variables were obtained from http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sbe.html 
except for Per Capita Personal Income, Proprietors’ Income and the Employment Rate which 
were attained from http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/.   
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